Matrix Encryption Scheme
Volume 2, Issue 4, Page No 56-58, 2017
Author’s Name: Abdelhakim Chillalia)
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Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Mathematics Physics and Computer Science, LSI, FP, Taza, Morocco
a)Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: abdelhakim.chillali@usmba.ac.ma
Adv. Sci. Technol. Eng. Syst. J. 2(4), 56-58 (2017); DOI: 10.25046/aj020408
Keywords: Public key cryptography, Discrete logarithm problem, Finite field
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In classical cryptography, the Hill cipher is a polygraphic substitution cipher based on linear algebra. In this work, we proposed a new problem applicable to the public key cryptography, based on the Matrices, called “Matrix discrete logarithm problem”, it uses certain elements formed by matrices whose coefficients are elements in a finite field. We have constructed an abelian group and, for the cryptographic part in this unreliable group, we then perform the computation corresponding to the algebraic equations, Returning the encrypted result to a receiver. Upon receipt of the result, the receiver can retrieve the sender’s clear message by performing the inverse calculation.
Received: 12 April 2017, Accepted: 04 May 2017, Published Online: 14 May 2017
1 Introduction
Public key cryptographic is the fundamental technology in secure communications. It was devised by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 to secret key distribution. The mathematical problems more used are the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). In 1985 the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) was proposed independently by Koblitz and Miller. In this paper, we present the Matrix discrete logarithm problem in a new cryptographic scheme. Consider a finite field L = Fq , where q is a power of p the characteristic
of L.[1, 2, 3] Throughout this work, we denote:
L∗ multiplicative group of L. Let a,b ∈ L∗ and let x,y ∈ L,
Myx = yba 1 xyb +1− 1 ! x −
+1 a
G = {Myxdet(Myx) = 1} Gq = G mod p.
Myx11 4Myx22 = Myx33
where,
b
(1) : yx33 == x12yx21+xa2abx+22ya12y1y2
Mk = k222+1k − 1 kk22−k1 − 1 ,k ∈ L∗.
k −1 +1 +1
2k
m = |Gq |
The next theorem whose proof is evident.
Theorem 1 The set Gq with the operator 4 defined by (1) is a abelian group.
The identity element is M0a, that if M = Myx then N = M−xy is the invertible element of M.
Remark 1 The MDLP consists of following for two elements M,N ∈ Gq, determine the scaler k ∈ Zm such that M4k = N. It is necessary that M be a generator of the group Gq.
Assumption 1 Given a group Gq and tow elements M and N ∈ Gq, there exists non polynomial time algorithm θ(logq) deciding the integer k such that M4k = N if such a k exists.
Assumption 2 Given a group Gq and θ(logq) elements Ni on Gq, there exists non polynomial time algorithm
(θ(logq)) deciding the integers ki, such that
N14k1 4N24k2 4…….4Nθ4(klogqθ(logq) ) = M
if such ki exist, where M is a random element on Gq.
2 Matrix Cryptosystem
2.1 Key distribution protocols
Let Myx be a generator of the group Gq. Alice take a private key 1 < l < m, and computes Myxll =
Myx4l, then she transmits Myxll to Bob. Similar, Bob takes a private key 1 < t < m, and computes Myxtt = Myx4t and transmits Myxtt to Alice. In the same way Alice and Bob compute Myxtltl = Myxtt 4l and Myxltlt = Myxll 4t respectively.
Theorem 2
xlt ylt xtl ytl
+ = + mod p a b a b
The secret key is α = xatl + ybtl mod p
2.2 Description of This Cryptosystem
Let L = Fq with q = pn.
1)Space of lights: P = Gq.
2)Space of quantified: C = Gq .
3)Space of the keys: K = L∗ .
4)Function of encryption:∀α ∈ K ,
eα:P −→ C
Myx 7−→ eα (Mxy) = Myx 4Mα
5)Function of decryption:∀α ∈ K ,
dα:C −→ P
Myx 7−→ dα(Mxy) = Myx 4M−α
Remark 2
dαoeα(Myx) = Myx 4Mα 4M−α = Myx
Remark 3 a) Secret key :α b) Public keys: 1) Space of lights; P
2) Space of quantified; C 3) Space of the keys; K
- Generator of the group P ; Myx
- Function of encryption; eα
- Function of decryption; dα
Remark 4 The Myxll , Myxtt and m are public and can known by another person, but to obtain the private key α, it is necessary to solve the Matrix problem discrete logarithm in Gq, what returns the discovery of the difficult key α.
2.3 Numerical Example
Alice and Bob Choose the following public numbers; p = 41, a = 2, b = 5, and n = 1. They determine the group G41 =< M3126 >, with the identity element M02.
- Exchange of the key deprived between Alice and Bob:
Alice take a private key; l = 13 < 39, calculation; M2313 = M3126413 and send to Bob M2313. In turn, Bob take a private key; t = 21 < 39, calculation; M1015 = M3126421 and send it to Alice. Alice and Bob calculate separately :
M1813 = M1015413 and M1813 = M2313421. They determine their secret key:
α = + = 6 mod 41
- Message to send:
Alice wants to send the following message
me = {M1828,M40,M2723,M3634 } It encrypts it using the encryption function
Mxy | e6(Myx) | ||
M2818 |
39 1 |
40
0 |
! |
M04 |
15 39 |
37
17 |
! |
M2327 |
28 17 |
13
30 |
! |
M3436 |
28 27 |
25
30 |
! |
- Message received:
Bob receives message crypt send by Alice
28 mr = { 27 |
25 ! 28
, 30 17 |
13 ! 15
, 30 39 |
37 ! 39
, 17 1 |
40 !
} 0 |
It decrypts it using the decryption function
Mxy | d6(Myx) | ||
39 1 |
40
0 |
! | M2818 |
15 39 |
37
17 |
! | M04 |
28 27 |
25
30 |
! | M3436 |
28 17 |
13
30 |
! | M2327 |
3 Example for cryptography
In this example we take p = 3, a = b = 1, n = 3, and α root of the polynomial X3 + 2X + 1. We have P = G27, C = G27, and K and Mα2α2 +2 is a generator of the group P .
- Exchange of the key deprived:
Alice take a private key l = 12 < 25, send to Bob Mαα2+1 = Mα2α2 +24l. Bob take a private key t = 20 < 25, send to Alice
M22αα22++2α+1 = Mα2α2 +24t. Their secret key is
β = 2α2 +2+α2 +2α +2 = 2α +1.
- Message Encryption:
It is known that the encryption functions and the decryption functions are defined by:
eβ(Myx) = Myx 4Mα2α2+22+2α+2 dβ(Myx) = Myx 4M22αα22++2α+1
Lets x = iα2+jα+k and y = lα2+mα+n, we denote Myx by ijklmn.
Each letter is represented by a ijklmn character. Often the simple The scheme a = 001000, b = 010112, …, z = 221102 is used, but this is Not an essential feature of encryption. To encrypt a message, each letter will be decrypted by the decryption function, for a message one obtains a block of n letters (considered as an n-component vector). Consider the message ’bonjour’ Which will be encrypted by the message: ”crvzrng”.
Table of the Symbol Encryption
Mxy | Symbol | eβ(Myx) | Encrypt Symbol |
001000 | a | 202120 | h |
010112 | b | 010220 | c |
010220 | c | 012210 | d |
012210 | d | 211110 | s |
012122 | e | 010112 | b |
122110 | f | 021210 | q |
122222 | g | 112102 | m |
202120 | h | 011101 | j |
202212 | i | 001000 | a |
011101 | j | 221102 | z |
011201 | k | 202212 | i |
112200 | l | 122110 | f |
112102 | m | 022101 | w |
002001 | n | 101212 | v |
020112 | o | 021122 | r |
020220 | p | 020112 | o |
021210 | q | 020220 | p |
021122 | r | 122222 | g |
211110 | s | 221200 | y |
211222 | t | 012122 | e |
101120 | u | 002001 | n |
101212 | v | 022201 | x |
022101 | w | 101120 | u |
022201 | x | 112200 | l |
221200 | y | 011201 | k |
221102 | z | 211222 | t |
4 Conclusion
Although matrix multiplication can not provide security for the encryption of a message [4, 5, 6], we have been able to construct a law of internal composition other than the law of multiplication, which allows us to create a cryptography on the matrices and which is safer for a key of reasonable length.
- A. Chillali, “Cryptography over elliptic curve of the ring Fq[e], e4 = 0 .”, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology., 78 , 848-850, 2011.
- A. Tadmori, A. Chillali, M. Ziane, “The binary operations calculus in Ea;b;c.”, International Journal of Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences., 9 , 171-175, 2015.
- A. Tadmori, A. Chillali, M. Ziane, “Elliptic Curve over Ring A4.”, Applied Mathematical Sciences., 35(9), 1721-1733, 2015.
- Lester S. Hill, “Cryptography in an Algebraic Alphabet.”, The American Mathematical Monthly., 36, 1929.
- Lester S. Hill, “Concerning Certain Linear Transformation Apparatus of Cryptography.”, The American Mathematical Monthly., 38(9), 1931.
- Christos Koukouvinos and Dimitris E. Simos, “Encryption Schemes based on Hadamard Matrices with Circulant Cores.”, Journal of Applied Mathematics and Bioinformatics., 1(3), 17-41, 2013.
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